ECB Insight: Vujčić’s Victory, or the Candidate Everyone Can Live With

23 January 2026

By David Barwick – FRANKFURT (Econostream) – The dust having settled following European Central Bank Governing Council member Boris Vujčić’s elevation to succeed Luis de Guindos as ECB vice president on Monday, the choice looks like a classic convergence outcome: a candidate who was not the clearest front-runner, but proved acceptable to the widest range of capitals in a crowded field.

His adeptness in shepherding Croatia into the euro in 2023 and the symbolism of bringing a Central and Eastern European country—and a newer euro-area member—onto the ECB Executive Board for the first time help explain why the race moved his way, but they are only part of the story.

Put simply, Vujčić can be seen as “all things to all people.” His monetary policy profile is moderately hawkish (a 0.75 on our hawk-dove ranking), which makes him palatable to the more conservative capitals.

Yet he is not so hawkish that the pick forces the 2027 presidency to swing sharply in the opposite direction as a matter of political “balance.” In other words, the more conservative capitals could reason that selecting him now can still leave room for a non-dovish president later.

That combination helps explain why he was able to emerge as a convergence candidate—alongside the geographic and political considerations that also shaped the coalition.

The relevance of this has to do with the fact that even if the vice presidency choice was no package deal, it cannot fail to be seen through the prism of the succession to ECB President Christine Lagarde next year.

A moderately hawkish vice president tends to narrow the case for a distinctly more hawkish president in 2027, simply because the top two posts would then tilt too far in one direction for a qualified majority coalition to assemble smoothly.

In that sense, the decision looks adverse for the most overtly hawkish presidency scenarios. Ex-Dutch National Bank Governor Klaas Knot’s odds have probably deteriorated, notwithstanding Bloomberg’s latest poll of economists that found him most likely to succeed Lagarde.

The same goes for hawkish Executive Board member Isabel Schnabel— quite aside from the legal hurdle she would face, Board terms being non-renewable.

By contrast, a conservative figure who is no hardliner (and never was), such as Bundesbank President Joachim Nagel, can still be imagined as viable: pairing a Nagel presidency with a Vujčić vice presidency might be a harder sell than a more centrist pairing, but it is not self-evidently impossible, especially if leaders compensate elsewhere in the package.

Equally important, to the extent some countries hope for a not-too-dovish president in 2027, that person would most likely be a Northern European, a camp Vujčić as a Croatian is harder to assign to than either Olli Rehn or the Baltic contenders.

That is yet another reason for some capitals to have deemed Vujčić the ideal solution to the question of which vice presidential pick would be palatable on his own without foreclosing on an agreeable successor to Lagarde.

For dovish capitals, the bet may also have looked safe. First, Vujčić is not so hawkish as to trigger their resistance. Second, his selection nonetheless means that the vice presidency did not go to one of “their” doves, a fact that can be used to argue against an even more hawkish president next year.

Several large capitals may have had a particularly easy time rationalizing the choice. Germany, for its part, could back a moderately hawkish vice president without surrendering the possibility of a broadly conservative president in 2027—keeping Nagel, in particular, within the realm of plausibility.

Spain would also have had a clear incentive to see the vice presidency land where it did. By contrast, a victory by ex-Banco de Portugal Governor Mário Centeno would have complicated Madrid’s 2027 options, both geographically and in terms of monetary policy philosophy.

Madrid is one of the few capitals with a top-tier female figure who could credibly enter the 2027 presidency conversation, European Investment Bank President Nadia Calviño. A moderately hawkish male vice president who in no way interferes geographically could make a Calviño pitch easier to balance politically.

Former Banco de España Governor Pablo Hernández de Cos naturally remains in play as well, and if leaders can contemplate de Cos leaving his post at the head of the Bank for International Settlements for the ECB presidency, it is difficult to argue that Calviño could not do the same at the EIB. The common thread is that Vujčić’s win does not foreclose either Spanish scenario; fellow Iberian Centeno would have.

Italy’s incentives are different, but potentially complementary. Rome is unlikely to expect the presidency while it already holds an Executive Board seat via Piero Cipollone, which may make it more likely to prioritize coalition coherence and stability over an ideological “win.” A Croatian vice president may also have felt, politically, like a natural neighbor outcome in a southern European sense rather than a northern one.

France, meanwhile, had reason to be comfortable. Lagarde’s view is not dispositive, but personal reputations and elite comfort levels matter in these decisions. Given her standing back home, it would be natural for the government to seek her views.

In this context, her public support of Vujčić back in June 2024—when his renewed appointment to his current position was still an open question—suggests that she may have reassured Paris that he would be institutionally “safe” and not a disruptive ideologue.

He also benefited from the Baltics’ strategic misfire. The region tried to create momentum, including through coordinated messaging, but the decision to run three candidacies simultaneously made it harder to form a single “Baltic juggernaut.” One commentator’s description of this as “fatal” may be overstated, but three similar bids can amplify a representation claim while diluting the ability to translate that claim into a coalition.

The European Parliament’s early preference for Mārtiņš Kazāks (alongside Mário Centeno) underscored that Kazāks was the best-positioned Baltic candidate. But it also may have accelerated consolidation dynamics in a way that ultimately disadvantaged the Baltics: once the process began producing focal points, capitals that were not inclined to follow Parliament still needed a convergence name, and Vujčić fit the bill.

Finally, there is the human factor. Vujčić has been around for a long time, is deservedly credited with guiding Croatia through euro adoption, and has made a habit of showing up—accepting invitations to speaking engagements far and wide, engaging with peers and building familiarity.

He appears to have put that stock of reputational capital to good use as ministers converged.