By David Barwick – FRANKFURT (Econostream) – Conflicting Spanish media reports over whether Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez’s government is prepared to back former European Central Bank Governing Council member Pablo Hernández de Cos for the ECB presidency have turned the succession issue into an open domestic debate while highlighting what we previously noted: clear evidence of official Spanish support remains scarce.
A new Vozpópuli report says Moncloa has “closed ranks” behind the former Bank of Spain governor and current Bank for International Settlements general manager, and is sounding out European and financial circles before any formal candidacy.
Digital daily Hispanidad, by contrast, now says Moncloa does not support de Cos, while another online publication, The Objective, has reported that Nadia Calviño, president of the European Investment Bank, has emerged as a government alternative after Moncloa supposedly ruled de Cos out.
We won’t pretend to be able to verify the precise status of deliberations within the Spanish government. It is, however, clear that rather than having become a settled national project, de Cos’ possible candidacy is the subject of active Spanish media and political contestation.
This is noteworthy, given that Spain can hardly expect to make de Cos the successor of ECB President Christine Lagarde without first eliminating any doubt that Madrid itself is prepared to spend political capital on him.
As we observed on May 21, there is still little public evidence that this is the case. Spanish support could of course still come, and de Cos remains a highly credible contender. But plausible participation and an endorsed candidacy—let alone a serious European campaign—are different things.
We would tend to treat Vozpópuli’s latest report cautiously, just as we did the outlet’s February reporting on de Cos. We wrote at the time that that story already looked more like de Cos-friendly positioning than decision.
Still, reports that Sánchez or Moncloa have effectively vetoed de Cos are also difficult to assess and need not perfectly reflect facts on the ground. That said, the logic behind such skepticism is not fanciful: de Cos was never an instinctive Sánchez pick, and his Bank of Spain governorship included repeated points of friction with the government over fiscal and structural policy.
Meanwhile, Calviño seems a logical alternative from Madrid’s point of view. She is politically closer to Sánchez, has European institutional standing, and would allow Spain to pursue the ECB presidency without relying on a former governor whose independence is part of his external appeal but may also be part of his domestic liability.
Moreover, as we argued on May 21, Calviño’s gender may be seen by Madrid as an advantage none of the other putative candidates to succeed Lagarde can match. Overlooked though they were in the context of the ECB vice presidency, gender balance considerations are bound to reemerge.
The recent statements of ECB Vice President Luis de Guindos also remain relevant. As we’ve highlighted, his public comments on de Cos have steadily cooled, with the emphasis shifting from the former governor’s merits to Spain’s broader need to regain a seat on the Executive Board.
De Guindos does not necessarily know that Madrid will not back de Cos. Yet his lack of full-throated support increasingly seems part of a wider pattern, and it is hard to believe he is speaking in complete ignorance of Spanish insider thinking.
The emerging Spanish media debate therefore strengthens rather than weakens the case for caution about de Cos’ prospects. Markets and ECB watchers may see him as Spain’s most credible ECB presidency option. But politicians will make a political decision, and it is not evident that Spain’s politicians have made theirs.